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ABSTRACT
The paper investigates the sources of debt and debt difficulties for
a group of Latin American countries. It is argued that external shocks——
oil, interest rates, world recession and the fall in real commodity prices—-.
cannot account by themselves for the problems. Budget deficits that
accommodate terms of trade deterioration and disequilibrium exchange rates
are central to a complete explanation. The paper documents that in Chile an
extreme currency overva'luation led to a massive shift into imported consumer
durables while in Argentina overvaluation in conjunction with financial
instability led to large—scale capital flight. In the case of Brazil the
budget deficit is the explanation for the growth in external indebtedness.
The difference in the experience of the three countries reflects the dif-






(6ii) 66l—882Revised, April 1984
EXTERNAL DEBT, BUDGET DEFICITS AND DISEQUILIBRUJM EXCHANGE RATES*
Rudiger Dornbusch
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
This paper explores the role of disequilibrium exchange rates and budget
deficits in promoting external indebtedness and the current debt crisis. Oil,
interest rates and world recession are often isolated as the chief causes of
the world debt crisis. But these factors only have made much more apparent
and unsustainable an underlying disequilibrium in which exchange rate
overvaluation and/or budget deficits were perpetuated by continuing and
excessive recourse to the world capital market.
The details of the disequilibrium differ, however, quite a bit between
countries. For that reason we look at three different episodes: Argentina,
Chile and Brazil. In one case capital flight plays a key role in the growth
in debt, in the other cases the level and composition of spending assume
primary importance. We investigate these determinants to the period 1978-82.
The period is chosen to coincide with major changes in the world economy and
with disequilibrium real exchange rate policies in several countries.
We start by laying out a framework and some facts concerning the debt
accumulation.
1. Some Facts and a Framework
Latin American debt problems are not new, and a year after the Mexican
and Brazilian problems became apparent the literature abounds with references
*An earlier version of this paper was presented at the ISPE Seminar on public
economics at the University of Santa Cruz, February 1994. I am indebted to
Domingo Cavallo, Eliana Cardoso and Stan Fischer for helpful comments.to the earlier episodes of overlending in the 1930s and before. Here is a
typical quote from 1937:1
"The history of investment in South America throughout the last century has
been one of confidence followed by disillusionment, of borrowing cycles
followed by widespread defaults, and of a series of alternating repudiations
and recognitions of external debts. Willingness to maintain service payments
has certainly been less high than in the British pire, and excesses were
inevitable under the conditions which existed while the United States was
investing such huge sums in these countries.. .The ability of the most
credit-worthy governments to avoid default must necessarily be impaired if any
considerable part of the nominal value of loans has not, in fact, been put to
the use for which it was intended."
After the wholesale default on external debt in the l930s there was a
long gap during which current account imbalances were financed by a reduction
in reserves (accumulated during the war), by direct capital inflows, official
aid and by borrowing conducted through international institutions.2 Table 1
shows external debt data for benchmark years for several countries. The data
problems, even for the very recent years, remain q.uite overwhelming. But even
SOthetable conveys a notion of the very rapid growth of external
indebtedness in the 1970s.
1See Royal Institute (1937) p.266.
2For a discussion see Sachs (1983), United Nations (1964) and the annual
reports of the Foreign Bond Holders Protective Council.3
Table 1External Public or Publicly Guaranteed Debt
(Billion su.s.)
1945 1956 1960 1970 1975 1983
0.9 0.7 1.5 5.0 7.9 38.5
0.4 1.5 1.8 5.5 22.2 93.7
0.4 0.3 0.6 3.2 5.3 18.7
0.5 0.5 1.0 9.7 19.5 86.6







Note: The data for 1945, 1956 and 1960 only include debt in excess of 1 year
maturity. The price level reported in the last row is the US GNP
deflator. The unit value index in dollars for world trade would show a
somewhat larger cumulative increase.
Source: United Nations (1964) and Morgan Guaranty.
)
From the supply side the conventional explanatio.n for the lending burst
is the oilshock that made possible financial intermediation by commercial
banks. This is brought out by the fact that over the period 1970 to 1983 the
share of bank lending in total debt increased from only 25% to nearly 75%. On
the demand side the reasons for the debt build—up are much less clearcut.
Oil, interest rates and the world recession are often cited and are certainly
a good part of the story in some countries.
Table 2 and Figure 1 show the important differences in the world
macroeconomic setting for the debtorsin the early l970s and in the 1978—83
period. The former period is clearly a debtors paradise with high growth and
inflation, sharp real commodity price increases and low nominal interest
rates. The 1978-82 period is precisely the reverse and to that extent must
account for some of the debt problems. Even so it remains interesting to know3a
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what the precise channels are. Wewill show in particular that domestic
policies and the degree and particular kind
of openness-..capjtal mobility,
free trade in goods, both or
neither__influence the way in which households
and firms respond to exchangerate, commercial and fiscal policy.
Table 2: Prime Rate, World Growthmd Price Inflation in World Trade
(Average Annual Percentage Rate)
Prime Rate Inflation Rate World Growth
in World Trade
1970—73 6.7 12.4 4.7
1979-82 15.5 4.4 1.1
President,1984.
A Framework. The balance of
payments accounts provide a link betweenthe
increase in gross external debt andthe portfolio and spending decisionsof
the economy. In equation (1)we show the change in officialreserves (9 or
the balance of payments) equal tothe current account surplus,CA, plus the
capital account surplus. The latter is brokenup in three components: net
direct and longterm portfolio
capital inflows, LCD, foreign borrowing,B, and
gross private capital outflows, KO.
(i) R =CASurplus +LCD+B-KO
Rearranging terms we can then identify thecomponents or proximate
sources of the increase in gross externaldebt as follows:
(2) B =CADeficit +(9+1(0)—KD
Increasedgross external debt, from (2) reflectsa current account
deficit, reserve build-up or privatecapital outflows, or a net outflow of
direct and portfolio capital.Equation (2) immediately draws attentionto the5
fact that the debt build—up does not correspond one—for—one to a resource
transfer from lending countries to the borrowers. Part of the increased gross
debt merely reflects capital flight and thus no change in aggregate net
foreign assets. Another part reflects the capitalization through increased
borrowing of the inflation component in nominal interest payments. The
resource transfer is limited to the inflation—adjusted current account.3
We now look at the period 1978-82 to identify empirically the various
components in (2) for Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico. In Table 3 we show
an estimate of the components of the gross debt increase. We use balance of
payments and external debt data, from different sources, to try and piece
together the "proximate sources" of the increase in gross external debt. The
difference in data sources and the precariousness of debt and balance of
payments data imply that these estimates cannot be very precise. Bearing in
mind tiese limitations the data still give a good idea of the difference in
patterns between countries.
In the case of Argentina the current account deficit is almost entirely
financed by direct investment and portfolio capital inflows. The increase in
debt therefore corresponds to a large extent to the financing of capital
flight—-the Central Bank borrows abroad and sells foreign exchange to private
residents who use the proceeds to acquire foreign assets. The breakdown is of
course not entirely precise because the current account certainly
underestimates military imports and, in the case of Argentina, perhaps to a
very significant extent. It has been suggested the underestimate maybe $7
3Iet A/F' be net real foreign assets measured in terms of world prices. Then
the change in real net foreign assets is:
(/p*) = - = -


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































billion. Underinvoicing of exports and overinvoicing of imports and smuggling
further distort the data
The table makes it clear that in the Argentinian case we are looking
primarily at an increased debt to finance capital flight, not current account
imbalances. Thus the government incurs external debts and uses the proceeds
to finance private capital outflows or private acquisition of foreign assets.
The increase in gross external debt misrepresents the net foreign asset
position of the country, since increased public debts are largely matched by
larger private foreign assets. But since the latter are largely removed from
the control and disposition of the authorities there is nevertheless a debt
problem.
In the case of Brazil and Chile the residual item in the last column
accounts for very little. The increased debt reflects current account
deficits, not capital flight. In both cases direct investment and portfolio
capital flows finance only part of the current account deficits and hence
external debt increases by the difference. Both countries, unlike Argentina,
have cumulative trade deficits, and of course deficits on service account. In
both cases interest payments account for half or more of the increase in debt.
We have shown now, in accounting terms, that increasedgross external
debt may correspond to increased net external indebtedness, as is thecase of
cumulative current account deficits, or it can simply reflect capital flight
with no change in the country's net foreign assets. This reshuffling between
the private sectcr and the government is relevant whenever the private
sector's foreign assets are beyond the reach of the authorities.7
2. Theory.
Cumulative current account deficitsare the more common counterpart of
increased external indebtedness.Equation (3) shows the linkage between the
national income accounts and thecurrent account:
(3) Decline in Aggregate =CADeficit =(I-s)+BudgetDeficit
Net Foreign Assets
Episodes of current account deficitscan, in this perspective, be
analyzed in terms of the shocks to which theeconomy is exposed and the impact
they exert on saving, investment and thebudget. We now discuss the channels
through which saving, investment and thebudget are affected. Throughout we
use standard neoclassical macroeconomicsas the relevant framework. We will
try to identify transitorily high levels ofinvestment and budget deficits or
transitorily low levels of saving.
Saving: Household Saving behavior takesplace in the standard multi—period
framework. Saving isgoverned by wealth which is the present valueof
after—taxlabor income plus the value of initialassets, and by the real
interestrate. The real interest rate is theworld nominal rate adjusted for
depreciation and the domestic rate ofinflation. The latter can differ from
that abroad to the extent that
traded/nontraded goods or export/importprices
change over time or through changes inexchange rate or ccmmerical policy.4
There are several channelsthrough which events in theeccromy can lead
to a reduction in saving:
this point see Bruno (1972), Obstfeld(1933), Razin and Svensson (1983), and Dornbusch (1983).8
—Anincrease in wealth because of perceived higher future incomes or an
increase in the future rental on domestic real capital. Since by assumption
the gains in output occur only in the future, but consumers are forward
looking, the anticipations lead to higher current spending and thus to
dissaving.
—Theeffect of expected future income gains on current spending is
reinforced if these anticipated gains come together with the removal of
borrowing constraints and increases in wealth that make it possible to spend
at the level of normal income.
—Dissavingmay be the counterpart of intertemporal resource allocation
by the household in response to intertemporal relative price and hence real
interest rate movements. With high intertemporal substitutability consumption
occurs in period where interest rates are low and inflation is high.
Purchases of consumer durables are an important reason for variations in
measured saving. Intertemporal variations in the real price of durables (and
even more strongly of the availability of durables) affect the timing of
purchases. They lead to purchases in periods where the real price is low.
This effect is more strongly at work the higher the rate of price increase on
durables relative to interest and the rate of physical depreciation. If
consumers perceive of themselves as "renting" durables the confidence in a
strong resale market and liquidity of durables reinforces the tendency for
intertemporal substitution of purchases, as does reduction of credit
constraints
In the context of an open economy a transitory real appreciation, or an
overvalued exchange rate, would therefore lead us to predict dissaving.
5SeeMishkin(1976) and Deaton and Muellbauer (1980), Chapter 1.9
Consumerswould concentrate purchases of imported durables in thoseperiods
and hence current account deficits would tend to belarge.
A critical question is to what extent private saving behavioris
affected by government budget deficits. In other words dohouseholds, in
response to deficits, build up assets in the anticipation of future taxes on
their own incomes and those of their heirs. We assume that theseeffects are
limited to taxes directly borne by the current generations and donot extend
further. Thus deficits are by and large not offsetby increased current and
future saving. Effects on saving result only fromdirectly anticipated
taxation or from a reduction in the value of assetsreflecting future taxes on
the income from those assets.
Investment: There are three channels through which investment is affected.We
are particularly concerned with the link between exchange rates and
investment. Inventory investment is influenced by the cost ofcarrying
inventories relative to the return on the foods being carried. Businessfixed
investment is influenced by changes in the desiredcapital stock and by
changes in the adjustment costs associated with capital formation. In the
appendix we sketch a formal model and focus here simply on the main ideas.
An anticipated depreciation implies capital gains onimported goods,
specifically on materials and foreign consumer or producer durables. Firms
would, other things equal, purchase importables prior to ananticipated
depreciation and hold them to collect capital gains. But thattendency is
dampened by three factors: First, there will after a point beincreasing
marginal costs to carrying inventories. Second, there isuncertainty about
the future price. Third, carrying inventories involvesan alternative cost in
terms of nominal interest foregone. The optimalinventory for risk averse10
investors firms, given these considerations, will depend on the mean and
variance of the expected real return on inventories——inflation relative to
interest rates and on the marginal cost of carrying. Increased anticipated
depreciation that is not reflected in interest rates and reduced variance will
raise inventory investment and hence imports of materials or imported producer
and consumer goods.
To discuss business fixed investment we can think of a standard
neoclassical adjustment cost—based investment theory. Real exchange rates
here play a role because they determine the desired capital stock by
influencing the user cost of capital or by affecting the adjustment cost.
Real exchange rates affect adjustment costs because investment has import
content, specifically in the form of imported machinery.
What are the effects of a transitory real appreciation or, equivalently,
an anticipated real depreciation? While the real exchange rate is overvalued
the real price of imported goods is low and, for that reason, investment is
high. During the period of overvaluation capital is being accumulated because
the overvaluation in fact constitutes an investment subsidy for those
investment activities that have import content. Once the real depreciation
occurs the accumulation of capital is reversed.
A second channel through which overvaluation or anticipated real
depreciation influence investment is via the desired stock of capital.
Suppose investment has significant import content and that capital is used in
the production of tradeables. A transitory overvaluation and anticipated real
depreciation now exerts opposing effects on investment. ThelOWreal price of
tradeables depresses the stock demand for capital, but the investment subsidy
implicit in overvaluation tends to promote investment. The net result depends11
on how significant the subsidy is as a determinant of investment. Then import
content is important the net result will still be a transitory investment boom
and hence an import boom of investment goods.
Once again we have assumed an anticipated real depreciation that is not
fully matched by interest rates. To the extent that nominal interest rates
rise in anticipation of depreciation this raises theuser cost and reduces
therefore any impact on investment.
In the case of investment, therefore, there are strong links between the
timepath of the real price of imports and the level of investment goods
imports. Anticipation of real depreciation must produce an import bulge.
The Budget: The government, in principle, obeys theintertemporal budget
constraint. The budget constraint states that the present value of tax
revenues (including the inflation tax) must equal the initial debt plus the
present value of outlays. Subject o political constraints on the rate of cut
in outlays or the rate of increase in taxes thegovernment would practice tax
smoothing as suggested in Barro (1983). A permanent loss in revenues would be
immediately and fully offset through increased tax rates or reduced outlays,
leaving debt unchanged. Transitory shocks to revenue or to outlays would be
substantially met by debt finance. The increase in debt in turn is amortized
over the longterm by a small increase in taxes and cut in outlays.
An increase in interest rates reduces the present value of theexcess of
taxes over outlays and hence requires an adjustment in thepath of taxes and
expenditures. Once again, if the shock is transitory debt finance will bridge
the gap in the shortterm and small tax and outlaychanges assure intertemporaJ.
solvency of the government. If the increase in rates is permanent then
immediate adjustment of tax rates relative to outlaysoccurs and debt rema.uw
unchanged.12
The tightness of the debt finance model must be relaxed to recognize
three practical considerations. First, there are constraints on the ratesat
which politicians can or will change taxes and outlays. Secondly, the
identification of disturbances as transitory or permanent may in itself take
time, a11 disturbances being assumed transitory, particularly when they are
adverse. Third, debt default both internal and external is a way of assuring
the intertemporal budget constraint although such a "policy" would of course
be reflected in the interest rate required by holders of the publicdebt.6
The government budget problem is made more specific when we introduce
specific standard of living constraints. Such constraints inplythat in the
presence of adverse shocks to the real income ofthe favored group additional
outlays are required to support the standard of living. If tax adjustments or
reductions in the standard of living can occur only over time there is a
built—in link between (adverse) economic shocks and the budget. Adverse
shocks therefore involve invariably an early stage of deficit finance, evenif
they are persistent.
A failure to smooth taxes and outlays as well as benefits in the case of
a permanent disturbance does need justification. Why would tax payersbe
willing to see low tax rates now and pay for those low rates by higherfuture
rates yielding equal present value tax collection? Why would those who
receive government benefits claim a front-loaded flow of benefits rather than
a steady stream of equal present value? The tax smoothing model rejectssuch
behavior as irrational and predicts that government following noxious policies
along these patterns would be thrown out of office for failing tomaximize
6 note in passing that wealth taxes or levies as a way of resonding to
shocks have been insufficiently considered in the recent deficit finance
literature, though not, of course, in the interwar writings.13
voters' welfare. But the moment the public discounts ata rate in excess of
the market rate of interest the future issystematically undervalued and
biased toward debt finance. The argument is reinforced whenliquidity
constraints lead part of the population to discount atexceptionally high
rates.
There is, of course, an interdependence between the model of debt finance
and the private sector's optimal intertemporal allocation ofresources and
portfolio choice. The more the government chooses debt finance,postponing
required tax increases, the more the private sector can adjust to the future
increased taxes or debt default by holding non-taxable assets (dollarsand
washing machines). This raises the cost to the government of delaying
adjustment, but does not eliminate altogether the tendency toward shortrun
deficit finance.
In concluding on the issue of the budget it is worthnoting important
linkages between the exchange rate and government outlays. These arise in two
respects. First, to the extent that there is an external public debt a real
depreciation raises the real value of debt service in terms of domesticoutput
and hence is likely to increase the budget deficit. There is thusa potential
trade-off between international competitiveness and budget balance.
The second link between exchange rates and the budget arises incase of
exchange rate guarantees. If the government has guaranteed a givenexchange
rate, sometime in the past, but has since found itnecessary to depreciate
then the resulting exchange rate subsidy will deteriorate thebudget. In a
situation where exchange rate guarantees and external debtexist, and it is
difficult to adjust taxes, there is thus a tendency to seekovervaluation as
of the ways to minimize debt finance.14
We have now reviewed the various channel3 through which the current
account is affected as a consequence of transitory and permanent disturbances.
The point that emerges is that anticipated real depreciation acts in a most
forceful way to generate current deficits in the external balance. In
addition, through the budget, current and transitory shocks to receipts and
outlays tend to translate into deficit finance and hence into external
deficits. We now consider how these considerations help explain the current
accounts and external debt accumulation of Brazil and Chile.
3.Applicationto Chile and Brazil.
In Brazil and Chile external debt increases are the counterpart of
current account deficits. They respresent levels of spending and resource
absorption in excess of current income. But the details of the process
differ. In Chile overvaluation is the key while in Brazil the budget deficit
assumes a central role.
Chile: Following hyperinflation Chile had undergone in 1973-77 economic
stabilization and reform in respect to fiscal policy and commercial policy.
The budget deficit was reduced from more than ten percent (asa fraction of
GNP) in the early 1970's to actual surplusses. Tariffs were reduced from
average nominal rates near 100 percent, with individual rates widely
dispersed, to a uniform rate of only 10 percent by 1978. Inflation was
reduced from over 500 percent per year to practically zero, and to top it off
growth in 1977—81 averaged 8 percent per year. Today the country bears little
resemblence to that performance: Output has declined since 19a1 by 10
percent,and unemployment stands at 30 percent. Exchange rate policy and
excessive recourse to external debt finance are at the center of an
explanation.15
In an effort to speed up the process of disinflation the Chilean
authorities decided in early 1979 to give a try to the "law of cne price".
The exchange rate was fixed at 39 pesos •to the U.S. dollar, in the hope that
the pegging would directly cut down the rate of inflation but also break
inflationary expectations. But at the time Chilean inflation was still more
than 30 percent, far above the rate in the U.S.. Moreover, formal indexing
arrangements linked wage increases to past inflation. As Corbo (1983) has
documented the combination of inflation and indexation led over time to
growing overvaluation as wages were pushed up relative to the prices of
importables and the world prices of exportables. The growth in real wages,
for those employed, of course implied a sharp gain in the standard of living.
The loss in employment in response to overvaluation was slow to build up and
thus the period 1977—80 offered a spectacle of yet another "miracle".
The Chilean boom conditions in the early stage of overvaluation lend
support to the notion that real depreciation, in the shortrun is deflationary.
Here the real appreciation, by raising real wages has expansionary effects on
aggregate demand before the employment effects and bankruptcy start making
their inroads. This point has been emphasized by Diaz Alejandro (1963) and
more recently by Calvo (1982) in the Argentinian context.
In Table 4 we show the ratio of consumption and of gross fixed investment
to GDP (in constant 1977 prices), as well as the budget deficit ratio. It is
clear that 198.0—82 is the period to focus on since consumption sharply rises
as does the investment ratio and the budget deficit. Investment and saving
behavior explain the sharp deterioration in the current account.16
Table 4: Consumption, Fixed Investment and the Budget Deficit in Chile
(Percent of GDP)
1960—69 1970—7919781979 1980 1981 1982
Investment 20.2 15.7 16.5 19.623.923.9 9.6
Consumption 79.7 75.8 72.471.170.576.2 76.1
Budget Deficit 2.9 6.8 0.8-1.7 —3.1 -1.6 2.4
Current Account NA NA 7.7 5.7 7.214.6 9.4
Source: Banco Central de Chile and International Financial Statistics.
We now focus on the mechanism through which consumption and investment
spending increased so sharply. Figure 2 shows the real exchange rate —-
importprices relative to the prices of nontradeables -—forthe period. The
real appreciation, on this measure, amounted to 25 percent by early 1982.
Table 4 shows some of the implications. Imports of all goods increased very
sharply over the period peaking in 1981. As a particular exanpie we see
automobiles. Import growth was immense both in percentage terms and as a
fraction of the existing stock. Imports peaked in 1981 falling off sharply
afterwards.
Table 5 Chile: Imports and the Real Exchange Rate
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
Imports (sus Billions) 3.00 4.22 5.82 6.78 3.83
Trade Balance (sus Billions)—0.52 —0.32 —0.45 —2.41 0.29
Real Exchange Rate
(1978 =lao)
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Table 6 shows the same pattern in more detail. The Table reports the
quantity indices for different groups of imports. In each case we observe the
sharp 1981 peak and the decline in 1982-83. The pattern is significantly more
pronounced for capital goods than for intermediates, even though in the latter
category automobile parts and pieces and intermediate industrial goods, unlike
primary commodities, show very high growth rates.7
Table 6: Import Quantity Indices for Chile
(January—June of each period)
1980 1981 1982 1983




































Intermediate Goods: 100 117 81 76
Source: Banco Central de Chile
The pattern of strongly growing imports through 1981 reflects in part the
very strong performance of the Chilean economy. In addition the increase in
asset prices that took place in 1977—81 implied increased wealth and hence the
allocation of part of the gain in wealth to increased consumption. Harberger
71n interpreting these numbers we bear in mind that from 1980 to 1981
industrial production was approximately flat while from 1981 to 1982 it
declined by around 20%. GDP growth in 1981 was 5.7 percent, -14.3 percent in
1982 and -0.5 in 1983.18
(1983) in particular has emphasized this point.
In addition to the growth and wealth impact on consumption and investment
there appears to be a strong real exchange rate effecton the composition and
level of spending. By 1981 the sustainability of theincreasingly overvalued
exchange rate was becoming an open question. While the goevernnent was sworn
to sustaining the exchange rate, the growing problems ofexport and import
competing firms, and growing unemployment made it more and more plausible that
depreciation would take place. Moreover, along with depreciation a return to
protection was not out of the question. In these circumstances it is clear
that we would expect to observe a sharp increase in purchases ofimportables.
Tables 3, 4 and 5, of course, bear that out in a massiveway. (See, too, in
Figure 3 the trade balance for 1981 that shows an all time deficit). They
also show that once the overvaluation came to an end, in June 1982, theimport
boom collapses.
The real exchange rate affects directly saving and investment and hence
the current account. But it also works through a separate char.el.
Overvaluation, once the shortrun expansionary effects have passed, leads to a
change in the composition of spending. Demand for domestic goods declines and
demand for importables rises. The shift implies a reduction in domestic
output and employment. The fall in income reduces saving of the private
sector and it also leads to an increased budget deficit.Accordingly the
indirect effects further deteriorate the external balance. Thesteep decline
in world copper prices in 1981—82 further reinforced the effect ofdeclining
income on the external balance. If the decline is perceivedas transitory it
leads to dissaving both by households and by the public sector and hence
enlarges the external deficit and borrowing. The copperprice aecline is, of
course, often cited as an explanation for the external deficit and debt0/
10
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Figure3 chile: Ratio of Trade Surplus to Exports19
accumulation. But the explanation cannot be taken too far. Even in 1982 the
dollar value of copper exports still exceeded the 1978 level by a large
.8
margin.
One further factor, which we will see in particular at work in the
Brazilian case, is the effect of increased interest rates in the world market.
For a debtor •ountry this implies a deterioration in the terms of trade and
hence an adverse real income effect. An estimate of the direct contribution
to the deficit of higher interest rates in the world market is S3.2 billion.
To a large extent the increase in Chile's external debt is the
counterpart of a domestic accumulation or consumer and producer capital. This
invites the question whether there is any lack of optiniality involved in what
happened in 1978-82 and where does the "debt problem" reside? Did consumers
and firms benefit froi the disequilibrium exchange rate and if so at whose
expense? Furthermore, assuming that the debt ultimately must be serviced is
there a welfare loss from disequilibrium exchange rate policy, setting aside
the implications for financial stability and economic activity?
The welfare economics of disequilibrium exchange rates appear quite
straight forward. We can think that the government borrows in the first
period in the world market and uses the proceeds to finance a transitory
consumption or investment subsidy on importables. In the second or more
8The dollar value ofcopper exports and the real price of copper (1980=100)
show the following pattern
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
Exports ($billion) 1.27 1.9 2.15 1.72 1.73
Real Price (1980=100) 81 102 100 82 73
The real price of copper here is measured in terms of the unit value of
industrial countries' exports.20
distant period taxes are collected to discharge the external debt. This
represents the public finance aspects of the overvaluation policy, neglecting
all macroeconomic side effects. It is apparent that a large subsidy of this
kind will have net adverse welfare effects and this is all the more the case
when we take into account the macroeconomic effects. The actual story is
somewhat more complicated because we must take into account the private
capital market. Consumers and firms perceive a net subsidy only to the extent
that market interest rates do not reflect the anticipated depreciation. Since
the government did not, in fact, lend itself at negative expected real
interest rates we must conclude that interest rates not fully reflecting
anticipated depreciation imply disagreement in the capital market about the
likely timing and magnitude of depreciation. Those anticipating large and
certain depreciation borrow and import, those anticipating small and unlikely
depreciation are the lenders. But the government comes back into the act when
we recognize that a policy of bailing out banks that are in trouble serves as
a safety net for the domestic financial operation and, effectively, makes the
whole operation almost exactly like the pure public finance scheme laid out
above.
Brazil The deterioration of the Brazilian external indebtedness is largely
due to failure to adjust the budget to the combined external shocks of higher
world interest rates and increased real oil prices. Higher interest rates and
increased oil prices were almost automatically reflected in larger deficits
through two channels: government subsidies that maintained a low domestic
price of oil and government external borrowing through state enterprises to
finance the increased debt service. Domestic adjustment through tight money
served to raise interest rates and stop growth, but its primary purpose was to
stimulate external borrowing to finance the current account. Failure to21
depreciate the real exchange rate meant that the economy stagnated despite
growing external deficits and debt.
Table 7 shows the external shocks. The terms of traded, as a consequence
of oil and the world recession deteriorated vastly. In addition interest
rates, including spreads, nearly doubled. The combined effect immediately
implied a very significant deterioration in the external balance unless
drastic domestic adjustment policies were pursued. Table 7 shows the
cumulative actual increase in debt between 1978 and 1982 as well as a
calculation of the effect of higher oil prices and interest rates.
In the calculation we cumulate the difference between the cost of
servicing the 1978 debt level at actual rather than at the 1978 Libor rates.
We also take the difference between the actual and the 1978 level of oil
imports. The sum, cumulated at actual interest rates is reported in the last
column. It measures approximately the increase in debt "due to external
shocks". It turns out to amount, cumulatively, almost exactly to the actual
increase in external debt. The calculation supports the notion that the debt
problem is due to the shocks; but it leaves open the question of the
macroeconomic channels through which the shocks are translated into external
deficits and debt accumulation. The budget deficit is an essential channel.22
Table 7 The External Shock to the Brazilian Economy
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
Lihor 8.9 12.1 14.2 16.8 13.2
Terms of Trade 76 79 65 55 54
(1977=100)
Oil Price 101 127 238 275 260
(sus, 1977=100)
Acutal Debt Increase 7.4 16.7 27.1 35.2
(Cumulative, Billion $ us)
Oil & Interest Effect* 3.6 11.7 23.5 34.8
(Cumulative, Billion $ us)
*Formethod see text
Source: IFS, Data Resources, Inc. and Conjunctura Economia.
In Table 8 we show the budget deficit as a fraction of GD? as well as the
growth r&te of real output. Budget data are not available before 1980. Since
then data are available both for the operational budget and the separate
category of interest (monetary correction).
Table 8 The Brazilian Public Sector Deficit and Growth
(Percent of GDP)
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982












RealDiesel Price 154 158 190 188
(1973=100
GDP Growth 6.7 7.9...9 1.4
Source:I.1F.Data Resources, Inc. andGazeta Mercantil, and Lauro Rainos.
Thelink betweenexternal sector the budget and current account deficits
stems in large part from extensive subsidies. The government subsidiziesdiesel oil because supply of merchandise in the interior is dependent on road
transport. While the real price of oil in the 1963—82 period increased
six—fold in the world market, the domestic price did not even double. But
subsidies also applied to a range of other goods especially food products. At
the same time there were agricultural subsidies at fixed nominal rates,
implying real interest rates of —60 percent and even more. The fact that the
budget deficit absorbed the external shocks meant that there was no automatic
private adjustment to increased world interest rates and increased real oil
prices. Nor did the increased budget deficit lead to offsetting domestic
saving in the anticipation of future taxes. Thus the externa. shocks
translated fully and automatically into the current account. The increased
interest costs were financed by increased external borrowing through state
enterprises and so was the increased budget deficit stemming from higher real
oil prices.
Brazil is certainly not a case where the increased external deficit
reflected an increase in investment. In 1965—77 investment as a fraction of
GDP averaged 21.7 percent. In the period 1978-81 it averaged cnly 20.5
percent. The increased deficit thus reflects consumption and the budget, not
an investment boom. In fact, the increasing monetary tightness that was
pursued in order to raise interest rates and thus attract capital flows cut
into investment.
The poor external performance of the country was not only due to a
failure to adjust the budget for increased costs of debt and subsidized
profams.A good part of the poor performance stems from a systenatic
overvaluatjon of the exchange rate. Figure 4 shows 'the real rate exchange
measured by non—coffee export prices relative to the domestic price level.2 3a
FIGURE 4 BRAZILIAN EXPORTPROFITABILITY
(Index 1975=100)
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The exchange rate policy of the post-1968 period had been to maintain a PPP
relation relative to the US WPI. But that policy of course implied that there
was no adjustment for increased real oil prices and interest rates, nor for
the vagaries of the dollar in terms of other major currencies.
The balance of payments consequences of the external shocks were
contained by increasing domestic oil production and by the domestic stop to
growth that reduced non-oil imports sharply. At the same time the
overvaluation of Argentina and the growth in oil exporting countries' imports
from Brazil led to a temporary export boom. In 1979—81 export revenue grew at
an average annual rate of 23 percent. The strong export growth and the poor
experience with the late—1979 maxi devaluation--inflation and no persistence
of the real depreciation because of preannounced depreciation belo the full,
accelerated irtdexation—-misled policy makers into maintaining a constant real
exchange rate. Failure to seek a large real depreciation as the longrun
adjustment to the deterioration in the external sector thus ultimately led to
the 1982 debt crisis and the catastrophic collapse of activity since.
Unlike in Chile and in Argentina there was no capital flight or flight into
imported durables. In part this is a consequence of the fact that the country
is closed both on trade and capital account. Imports are severely restricted
and thus a Chilean style flight into imported durables is inconceivable. The
only capital flight, leaving aside under and overinvoicing, iust take place
through the black market or through special accounts in the central bank where
exchange rate guarantees are offered to capital importers. But on neither,
account does the capital flight lead to an increased external deficit and
debt. In one case it is reflected in the increased premium in the black25
market. In the other case firms and banks that have borrowed abroad in
dollars and wish to repay their loans prior to maturity can liquidate their
dollar debts by making a deposit in the central bank, with the central bank
carrying the loan and the exchange rate risk to maturity. In this case
capital flight takes the form of paying off dollar loans by making deposits in
the central bank. There is no impact on foreign exchange reserves. The only
effects are a monetary contraction and, should a devaluation take place prior
tomturity, a futurc increased budget deficit as the central bank purchases
foreign exchange to service the debt.9
The only place where real exchange rate effects are quite apparent is in
respect to tourism. Here the respective over and undervaluation of currencies
in Argentina and Brazil is significant as is the interaction of the respective
black mar1ets. In the first quarter of 1981 the massive Argentinian
overvaluation leads to a surplus in Brazil's net travel balance, in the second
and third quarter of 1982 a huge black market premium in Brazil, together with
a $2000 tourist allowance at the official rate lead to a huge deficit. But
these swings in the tourist balance stay within less than one billion dollars
and thus are more an indication of exchange rate mismanagement than a
substantive part of the debt story.
In 1973—75 LDCs were generally applauded for sustaining growth in the
face of world recession by running external deficits financed in the world
capital market. Brazil followed that pattern at the time and, again in the
1978-82 period. The experience raises the question how a country should
decide between financing and adjustment in the face of transitory shocks such
9See R. Dornbusch and A. Moura da Silva (1983).26
as interest rate increases or more permanent shocks such as increased real oil
prices. Moreover, if longterm domestic energy projects are present——Brazil's
alcohol program and oil production-—is it sensible to sustain growth even, if
that means debt in the interim rises to a higher longrun level? The Brazilian
experience brings out particularly clearly the fact that we do not have a
sensible model of the optimal level of external debt. Our models merely tell
us that debt trajectories are unsustainable when the trend growth rate of
exports, say, falls short of the rate of interest. Brazil's case suggests
that the automatic capitalization of transitory interest rate shocks or terms
of trade shocks runs into risks if rolling over is not automatic. In such a
model the joint probability of adverse shocks and credit rationing, and their
persistence may lead to exactly the opposite pattern of the 1973-75 period.
Debt is retired through a deflationary strategy before the costly credit
rationing occurs or, aggressive export promotion and import substitution
measures accompany the continued borrowing. The philosophy "debt does not get
paid, debt gets rolled" then is poor advice.
4. Argentina: Capital Flight
In the case of Argentina external debt accumulation financed primarily
capital flight, not current account inbalances. Unlike Chile, Argentina had
severe political instability, continuing high protection, but completely
unrestricted capital flows. For these reasons purchases of external assets
rather than imported durables were the obvious way to escape from instability
and expected depreciation. Moreover, again unlike in Chile, there was clearly
no sharp increase in investment. Thus the trade deterioration in 1979-80 is
not a significant part of the story. Nor does the $ 1 billion deterioration
in the travel account explain much of the increased debt. The large outflow
of shortterm capital indicated in Table 9ismore central to the explanation27
of the debt build-up. Of course, one must leave the reservation that the
trade data do not include all military imports——as much as $7 billion are
missing in one estimate-—and to that extent may lead us to apportion too large
a part of the debt increase to the capital account.
Table 9 Argentina: Trade, Capital Flows and Debt
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
2.9 1.8 -1.4 0.7 2.7
1.9 -0.5 -4.8 -4.7 -2.5
2.8 6.5 8.0 8.5 0.9
0.4 0.5 0.9 2.0 3.3









Figure 5 shows the Argentinian real exchange rate that is central to an
explanation of the capital flows. Under finance minister Martinez de Hoz the
exchange rate was used systematically to stabilize inflation. First, until
December 1978 the rate was managed by the central bank allowing deliberate
real appreciation. Then, from December 1978 until March 1981 the rate
followed a preannounced "tablita". In 1980 the continued prefixing of the
exchange rate became doubtful. Overvaluation was apparent and the coming
change in the presidency led to the belief in depreciation and instability.
With no limitations on private capital outflows there was a massive shift into
foreign assets. The flight into foreign assets included purchases of US
currency, bank deposits and securities abroad as well as real estate
especially in the US and in Brazil.TUE ARGENTINIAN REAL [XCAi'G1Y RATE
(Index 1978—83400)
19761977 1978 1979 1980 1981







The source of capital flight is the combination of currency overvaluation
and ongoing and increasing domestic financial instability. The domestic
instability derives from an inability to bring fiscal deficits under control
and stop the inflationary process in a decisive way. In fact, in 1980—81 the
deficit, even setting aside debt service, strongly deteriorated. Table 10
shows some of the results.
Table 10: Argentinian Financial Instability
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
92 68 66 78 109
)
176 160 101 105 165
)
)









Budget Deficit 10.1 9.0 11.3
(ofGDP)
Exci. Debt Service 1.8 2.4 7.2
Source: 1101983), Data Resources Inc., International
Statistics and Indicadores de Coyuntura.
the Malvinas war and the resulting inability to further tap the world
market, combined with domestic exchange control end the episode. The
most interesting aspect of the Argentinian public external indebtedness is
that it appears to be matched, one for one or better, by increased private
holdings of external assets. But because the authorities have no access to
these assets there is nevertheless an acute debt problem. In the aftermath of
these disturbances the question remains whether any significant portion of the
capital would return in case of an effective stabilization program.




The popular view of growing LDC debts is that they reflect unsound
budgetary policies or unsustainable growth programs. Sachs (1983) by contrast
has argued that current account imbalances of the 1970s reflect high,
productive investment that fully justify external borrowing. Bankers who have
poured money into these countries certainly favor the view that they have
supported productive investment thus making it plausible that debts should be
serviced. In this review of the debt experience of Argentina, Brazil and
Chile, we find a much more mixed story. Only in Chile does investment play
any significant part in the current account deterioration. But clearly
imports of consumer goods play at least as significant a role. Moreover, the
burst in imports and the resulting current account deterioration is primarily
due to currency overvaluation.
In Argentina and Brazil increased investment plays absolutely no role in
the debt increase. In the case of Brazil the budget deficit and the lack of
an adjustment of the public sector to external shocks are behind the debt
growth. The failure to adjust the real exchange rate, in this case, explains
the longterm debt difficulties. In the case of Argentina currency
overvaluation in conjunction with prosepcts of political instability and
international capital mobility explain the increased debt. Here the current
account plays little role and capital flight is behind increased debt.
The examples in no way suggest that investment is unimportant in the
context of current account inbalances. But whether it does play a significant
role depends in part on whether trade and/or capital are free to move and in
part on the prospects for economic stability. when trade is relatively
unhampered and prospects are bright investment may be central. In other cases
public sector dissaving or capital flight are more plausible sources of30
external imbalance.
There are important differences in the three episodes studied. The
countries differ, in the 1978-82 period, in terms of financial and political
stability, and in terms of openness. Argentina is the most unstable and the
most open on capital account. Capital flight, therefore, is the obvious
response to exchange rate instability and deteriorating expected returns on
domestic assets. While some trade liberalization accompanied the
overvaluation experience flight into importables still seems to have been
minor. Chile is at the other extreme with domestic policitcal stability and,
at least initially, a budget surplus. The complete liberalization of trade
together with initial prosperity of households and firms leads to an import
boom that makes up for years of high tariff walls. But because there is no
expectation of a financial collapse, currency reform, wealth taxes etc.,
capital outflows never, come into play in a major way.
Brazil shares Argentina's financial instability; the budget deficit is
vast and any attempt at stabilization takes the form of tight money which, in
the context of indexation, aggravates the condition of the financial system by
causing debt to be growing more rapidly, the tax base to shrink and firms to
go bankrupt. The 1979 change in the economic team signals a direction of
fiscal irresponsibility, but even so the Chilean or Argentinian style flight
into foreign assets or goods remain impossible because the economy is firmly
closed. Even though the economy is severely closed the financial instability
can only be sustained by raising interest rates to force items into the world
capital market, renewing loans and taking f'esh credit, thus financing the
budget and current account deficit. The closeness of the economy in respect
to trade, combined with the interest rate policy assure that the system
continues until the external borrowing constraints of 1982 emerge. Failure to31
allow a real depreciation in time then meant that the country was unprepared
to absorb the drying up of external credit expect through a severe depression.32
APPENDI X
Investment: Significant changes in investment can come about through two
channels. The first is a transitory increase in investment as a result of an
increased desired capital stock; the other is a change in the timing of
investment in response to intertemporal relative price variations. We draw up
a standard investment model to isolate these effects.
The desired capital stock depends on the required rate of return net of
capital depreciation, i +d—Q/Q,and on the real price of capital (Q/P)
as can be derived from the standard arbitrage condition:
(4) Pf'(k)/Qi +dQ/Q
or
(5) k =g((i+d-Q/Q)Q/P)) ;g' < o
Onthe investment side we assume adjustment costs and also assume that
imports as well as domestic output are inputs in the production of
investment. We assume a proportional import requirement and an increasing
marginal domestic input requirement. The solution to the investment problem
then is a rate of investment that depends positively on the real price of
capital in terms of imports, Q/Pin.1
(6) I =h(Q/P,v) ;v =pm/p
where v is the real exchange rate or the real price of domestic goods in terms
of importables. The investment model is completed by the capital accumulation
1Suppose firms in the investment business maximize the value ofprofits
Z =QI—aPmI—Pb(I)with b', b" > 0. The coefficient a denotes the constant
unit import content of investment. The first order condition is b'(I) =(Q/P
-av)or I =h(Q/P,v)with v =Pm/P.33
equation:
(7) k =h(Q/P,v)-dk
The rational expectations equilibrium, given a constant real exchange
rate and interest rate, can be visualized in terms of the conventional phase
diagram. The equilibrium capital stock and the real price of capital follow a
saddlepath to the steady state.
Consider now the anticipation of an increase in the real cost of imports
which acts as a temporary investment stimulus. This is shown in Figure 1.
Starting from an initial equilibrium at point E there is an expectation that
the real exchange rate will depreciate or the real price of imports in terms
of domestic goods will rise in the future. There is an immediate jump in the
real price of assets and that higher real price promotes a transitory
investment boom. Once the real depreciation does take place (point E") the
real price of capital keeps rising but now disinvestment takes place. Pending
an anticipated real depreciation, therefore, we expect investment and hence
investment goods imports, to be high. The same analysis, of course, applies
to a transitory decline in the real price of imports.
The exposition so far assumed that capital is used to produce domestic
goods but has itself import content. There is another case in which
anticipated real depreciation has a significant impact on investment. In this
case capital is used to produce tradeables and investment has an import
content. A real depreciation, in the longrun must raise the real price of
capital but the capital stock may rise or fall. However, pending the
anticipated increase in the real price of tradeables there will be an








Consumer Durables: Consider a much simplified of durables where we neglect
time preference, depreciation and resale as well as non-durables. The
consumer's welfare depends on the services from durables in two period, the
second period being denoted by a prime.
(8) U =v(s)+v(s')
Services are given by the cumulative stock
()S=D,S' =D+D'
where D denotes durable purchases.
The budget constraint is
(10) Y -T=PD+P'D'
where Y —Tdenotes the present value of income net of taxes and P' is the
discounted second period price. We assume P < F' < P' where F' is the
equilibrium real price under a correctly valued real exchange rate while P is
the price consumers actual face.
For the economy, in the aggregate, tax payments are T =(p*-P)Dbut the
individual household takes taxes as unrelated to purchases. The individual
faces the budget line obtained by adding D to both sides of (10) to obtain:
(lOa) S' =(Y-T)/P'+(1-D/D')s
Figure A—2 shows the consumer equilibrium. The consumer views the budget
line as having a slope dS'/dS =1-PIP'which is flatter than the slope of
the social budget line dS'/dS =1—P*/P'.Consumer equilibrium, including
the subsidy distortion due to overvaluation, is at point A' on indifference
curve U with excessive purchases of durables in the first period and a level
of welfare lower than at A" on indifference curve U. It is apparent that the
larger is the subsidy the further the equilibrium lies to the south—east of
A", thus further deteriorating welfare.




Figure A-t Conser Ilirables andDisequi1ibritniiExchangeRates
U
Y/P*35
consumptionpoint A would be chosen in the first period, leading to second
period distress once the taxes are collected. This consideration is of
interest because it helps explain the collapse of durable purchases after 1981.36
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